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Three years after Lonrho made the front pages
with its "battle of the boardroom" and Mr.
Heath characterised it as the "unacceptable face
of capitalism there is a rather more muted flurry
as studies begun at that time emerge from the
press.
With about 1,250 pages of reading matter one
might assume that a clear picture of Lonrho
would emerge but it is not so. None of the
volumes tells much about Lonrho's financial
results for its shareholders, its economic impact
on its hosts (in any quantifiable sense and con-
trasted to any alternatives), its rather special
nature as an entrepreneur of financial opportun-
ism crossed with a pack rat and its highly dis-
aggregated approach to group management and
control. Indeed two brief press reports: 'A loose
style of ownership' (Financial Times, November
5, 1976, p. 19) and 'flat-footed', Economist Nov-
ember 20, 1976, p. 134), are at least as illuminat-
ing about the last two areas as the three major
tomes together!
Any number of issues can be pursued from the
material now made available, but three appear
especially significant:
The state of company law and inspection;
The state of Lonrho;
The "unacceptable face of capitalism" as exem-
plifiedor otherwiseby Lonrho and as revealed
or otherwisein the volumes.
The immediate reaction to the Inspectors' Report
must be that it neither paints a coherent picture
of Lonrho, gives the shareholders much basis for
considered action, seriously explores the legal or
moral transgressions (if any) of Lonrho or its
key figures, nor presents what it does find in an
accessible manner. Further, it is wildly uneven
in harshly criticising possible poor judgement (and
the Inspectors' views on this are none too con-
vincing at times) while glossing over what the
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man in the street (or in the City or in No. 10
Downing Street in 1973) might consider out-
rageous conduct ("Special Payments" have eight
paragraphs out of 1,000).
Lonrho's criticisms, while clearly self serving,
are not by any means always wide of the mark
on particulars and their general complaintthat
Inspectoral procedures are not well designed to
secure either an unvarnished knowledge of the
probable and the true or an evidently just judge-
ment on the provably wronghas much merit.
However, the most crucial problem lies deeper.
The Investigators are working within a legal
framework which makes them bound to investi-
gate criticisms and claims, evidence and imputa-
tions suggesting actions damaging to shareholders
and creditors or in violation of company law
(largely directed to protecting the same groups,
but having a bureaucratic and regulatory life of
its own). It is open to question whether this is a
suitable framework for examining a transnational
group whose impact on employees and econo-
mies, heads of state and political processes, in-
ternational trade and territorial development is
in aggregate much more critical than its conform-
ity to City codes, promotion of institutional and
individual shareholder interests and ability to pay
creditors.
Even in the given frame a territorial problem
arisesare the Inspectors' concerns to be limited
to the United Kingdom, its subjects and corn-
panics quoted in London? Apparently notthe
treatment of minority shareholdings in some
South African companies was includedbut
somewhat selectively so; criticisms of certain
West and East African transactions were made
in 1971-73 but the report steadfastly sticks to
London, Rhodesia and South Africa.
As to the state of Lonrho, the Report tells us
little beyond the key facts that it is and has been
for 15 years the extended shadow of one man-
R. W. (Tiny) Rowlandthat this man is not very
tolerant of dissent, caution, retreat or orderly
procedure so that information to the Board and
shareholders (or to anyone else) is rarely either
copious or unedited; that Tiny is adept at build-
ing power (political) coalitions to make deals and
win struggles whether for Lonrho or for control
over Lonrho, and that the concept of being seen
to be free of conflicts of interest and self-dealing
is one as foreign to his nature as the constraints
of a normal business bureaucracy.
Cronje, Cronje and Ling in some ways paint a
fuller picture, although the nature of Tiny Row-
land comes through less clearly and (oddly) the
narrative seems more dated. Lonrho's overall
activities by territory and sector are covered as
are some major successes (Ashanti Goldfields,
Holt, Swaziland Sugar) and failures (the attempt
to set up an oil consultancy to the OAU, the
collapse of the Tanzanian 'province' through
nationalisation) which appear fleetingly or not at
all in the Inspectors' Report. However, the finan-
cial and economic analysis is scarcely more com-
prehensive or coherent, and in even less depth,
than the Inspectors.
For the record, pre-Rowland Lonrho had a profit
before tax of £113,000 in 1960. By 1965 it was
£1,820,000 and by 1975 £63,310,000. (Ironically,
the leader of the ousted directors, Sir Basil Small-
peice, had viewed Rowland's boast that he could
achieve a £50-100 million profit as a "flight of
fancy".) To that extent Tiny, the men who picked
him for Lonrho (especially Messrs. Drayton, Ball,
Ogilvy) and the shareholders who have backed
him are righthis style does produce results.
However, it is equally clear that Lonrho has a
succession problem looming larger as Rowland
passes each birthday and a constant danger of
crisis if his judgements go sour, come in too
quick succession (the real cause of the liquidity
crisis), or run into obstacles beyond his control
(e.g. the South African prosecution, the initially
tiny band who broke the OAU arrangements,
the price of copper or platinum, the pace of
emission control laws, the future of Zimbabwe).
For an evaluation of what Lonrho means to its
hosts' societies, one must start on one's own. The
Report neither seeks to conduct such an exercise
nor provides a framework for one; Cronje, Cronje
and Ling's framework is rather intuitive and their
presentation too episodic and impressionistic.
What then of the "unacceptable face of capital-
ism"? One problem here is that one group exem-
plified by Mr Heath (like Adam Smith before
him) worries about businessmen's standards of
morality, social concern and responsibility to
those they affect beyond shareholders and credi-
tors, and seeks to establish a professional code
in this area. Another (presumably including the
present Government which helped finance
Lonrho's rescue of Brentford Nylons) puts its
faith in outside control over businessmen and
implicitly doubts the possibility of internal self-
discipline or the "acceptable face of capitalism"
(for Mr. Heath the North Sea oil exploration,
where funds and careers were risked and real
flows of new goods created). A third, more
radical, would query the possibility of any
'acceptable' capitalism, regulated or free, buca-
neering or citified, private or state.
On information, accountability and openness at
Lonrho one need only quote Rowland himself:
Lonrho is in my view nothing else but Alan
[Ball], yourself [Angus Ogilvy] and myself
Report: 441
and
the people used to troop into his various invest-
ments, 17 or 18 companies and Harley [Dray-
ton] would say "Well we are going to sell this,
we are going to buy this, and incidently he has
got this, and I hope have done that", and this
was the pattern and the right sort of behaviour,
and the rest was sort of Christmas tree
decorations.
Report: 451
Tiny does believe this, and his actions are con-
sistent with the belief. Whether it works for the
shareholders (who, probably rightly, feel that it
is the challengers and critics rather than Rowland
who have hurt them) is one thingwhether it is
an acceptable way to run an institution affecting
the lives of millions in tens of countries is
another.
On "Special Payments" perhaps one can best
quote Angus Ogilvy:
I was not against the principle or would not
be against the principle of bribery because I
think it has got to be done in certain countries;
it is part of doing business like paying a mer-
chant bank an underwriting fee.
Report: 638
The Inspectors ruled out study of entertainment,
gifts in kind and commissions and on other pay-
ments and only concerned themselves with
whether the payments were made in connection
with the development of the group's business out-
side the UK". (Here Lonrho says "the vast major-
ity of which were contributions to political parties
in Africa, in the same way as other companies
make political contributions in this country"
(Statement: 7). One may wonder whether they
like the Director whom they criticise for it-
were not among those who "preferred not to
know the details of the payments". The US
Securities and Exchange Commission (rather
whimsically as a shareholder protection device!)
and the Church Committee of the Senate have
taken a rather tougher (or less 'realistic'?) line.
On Rhodesian sanctions the case is both crystal
clear and muddy. As Lonrho's solicitors warned,
Lonrho's data:
discloses on its face evidence which would
support a charge against company officers and
personnel in London . . . Counsel expressed
the view, which we endorse, that there could
be no defence to such a charge.
Report: 147
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Ex-Director Gerald Percy was cynically and
brutally realistic in his assessment that Lonrho
violated sanctions legislation and that the whole
Board knew it but that so did every other UK
company with major subsidiaries in Rhodesia.
Mr. Rowlandfairly frequently and not only in
the Statement and Memorandumhas pointed
to the key role of UK based banks and of British
Petroleum inter oua in sanctions busting. As a
defence this may be weak, as a criticism it is
cogent. Lonrho has not been charged with sanc-
tion offences. The UK rejects the operative sec-
tions of the World Court Judgement on South-
west Africa (Namibia) because to do so would
make it a receiver (or a party to a conspiracy to
steal) in respect of the contracts for purchase of
Rossing Uranium.
Rowland has criticised Smith, has provided legal
advice to Nkomo, has built up Lonrho and per-
sonal assets in Rhodesia, has at the least chan-
nelled the benefits of actions helping sustain UDI
to Lonrho and to himself. There is in this no
inconsistency for himas Cronje, Cronje and
Ling show on a wider canvas, his goal is to make
money with whatever partners and in whatever
political setting is conducive to that end.
A final key issue remains obscurehow does
Lonrho make money? It is not an asset stripper:
if anything it tends to squirrel away ill-assorted
and none too promising companies like nuts. Nor
is it a technology and management powerhouse-
the quality of acquisition performance seems
quite unaltered by Lonrho's takeover. Nor does
Lonrho seem to produce much that was not
fairly sure to be produced anyway.
Lonrho seems to be a conglomerate based on the
timely acquisition of companies whose profits
were about to rise anyhow, projects needing
finance for a 'ripe' scheme and sound companies
for some reason on the bargain counter. Rowland
is an entrepreneur of financial opportunities, not
of knowledge or production or management. This
has paid his shareholders and not injured his
creditors. It probably does not harm group
employees. But what of customers, host states, ex-
owners? Is the feeling that there is a real dif-
ference between he who makes more or better
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and he who juggles sums (even if within the law)
totally wrong? In terms of UK company law it
probably is. Equally, is the image that Hedsor
Wharf, the Mystère jet, the overseas payments
(to politicians or to tax-avoiding employees), the
carefully structured band of Board brothers
(Rowland-Ball-Ogilvy via Yeoman), really ac-
ceptable if due disclosure is made to Board and
shareholders?
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